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Abstract. Nowadays, one of the most powerful side channel attacks (SCA) is pro-
filed attack. Machine learning algorithms, for example support vector machine, are
currently used for improving the effectiveness of the attack. One issue when using
SVM-based profiled attack is extracting points of interest, or features from power
traces. So far, studies in SCA domain have selected the points of interest (POIs)
from the raw power trace for the classifiers. Our work proposes a novel method for
finding POIs that based on the combining variational mode decomposition (VMD)
and Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization (GSO). That is, VMD is used to decompose
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the power traces into sub-signals (modes) of different frequencies and POIs selection
process based on GSO is conducted on these sub-signals. As a result, the selected
POIs are used for SVM classifier to conduct profiled attack. This attack method
outperforms other profiled attacks in the same attack scenario. Experiments were
performed on a trace data set collected from the Atmega8515 smart card run on
the side channel evaluation board Sakura-G/W and the data set of DPA contest v4
to verify the effectiveness of our method in reducing number of power traces for the
attacks, especially with noisy power traces.
Keywords: Points of interest, profiled attack, side channel attack, support vector
machine, variational mode decomposition, Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
Mathematics Subject Classification 2010: 94A60
1 INTRODUCTION
Side channel attack is one of the most powerful cryptoanalysis technique for revealing
secret key or sensitive information stored on cryptographic devices. The conducting
of SCA is based on the analyzing of unintended side channel leakages observed from
the devices during cryptographic algorithms run on. There are so many forms of
the observed leakages, but the time of operation, the power consumption of the
devices, or electromagnetic radiation are the most common uses. SCAs based on
the power consumption are known as the power analysis attacks first proposed by
Kocher et al. in the late 1990s [1]. These attacks rely on the physical nature of
instantaneous power consumption of a cryptographic device depends on the data
being processed and the operation being executed. This dependency can be used to
expose the data that contains secret key of a cryptographic device.
Depending on the knowledge of attacker about the device under attack as well as
the statistical method of analysis and extraction of information from the power con-
sumption traces, SCAs are classified in to two main classes: non-profiled attacks and
profiled attacks. Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [1], Correlation Power Analysis
(CPA) [2], Mutual Information Analysis (MIA) [3] attacks belong to the first class.
These are considered as effective attack methods when the attacker has only an
attack device and information of its implementation. The profiled attacks are used
when the attacker has the same device as the attack device with full control over. By
this device, the attacker is able to accurately characterize the power consumption of
the device that results in attack efficiency is much higher than non-profiled attacks
in the number of power consumption measurements needed for success in revealing
secret key.
So far, there is a lot of attention on profiled attack in SCA research commu-
nity. The first one is called template attack, as proposed in [4] by Chari et al.,
relies on assumption that power consumption characteristic follows multivariate
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Gaussian distribution. However, in general, this assumption should be not met,
machine learning techniques are introduced to conducting profiled attacks. Con-
sequently, several works have applied machine learning techniques to profiled SCA
attacks [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. These works all indicate that machine learning based pro-
filed attacks are more efficient and SVM is commonly used as machine learning
algorithm.
Machine learning based profiled attacks relax the need for probability distribu-
tions of side channel leakage traces but still require specific extraction techniques
to identify points of interest (POIs) on the traces or feature selection in machine
learning domain. In SCA, POIs are time sample points from the power traces
that correspond to the calculation of the sensitive variables being targeted and
their values change according to those variables [10]. The POIs selection, as in-
put features to machine learning algorithms is critical for two main reasons as fol-
lows:
1. the power traces are usually acquired by a measurement equipment with high
sampling rates and so consist of a large amount of time samples. However, often
only a relatively small range of these time samples is informative or statistically
dependent on a sensitive target variable;
2. power traces are considered as highly multi-dimensional data that results in
the curse of dimensionality issues with machine learning algorithms. That is,
computational and runtime complexity for them to solve a task increase.
Therefore, POIs selection is critical to the effectiveness of the profiled attacks. The
more precisely the POIs are selected, the better the ability to characterize the power
consumption of a profiled device, resulting in increasing attack efficiency and vice
versa. Our work focuses on a method for finding POI for SVM-based profiled at-
tacks.
1.1 Related Works
Some studies in the side channel community focus on methods of finding POIs for
profiled attacks, which can be classified into four classes: filter methods, dimension-
ality reduction method, wrapper and hybrid methods, and machine learning based
methods. In filter methods, POIs selection process operates on the base of com-
putation of some sample-wise statistics, whose aim is to quantify a sort of signal
strength. The signal-strength estimates are derived from classical side channel at-
tack distinguishers computed under the right key hypothesis, such as the Difference
of Means [4] or Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) [11]. Other deployed estimates
are the Sum of Squared Differences [12], the Signal-to-Noise Ratio [13, 14], and the
Sum of Squared t-differences, corresponding to the t-test [12]. Once the chosen
signal-strength estimate is computed, all time samples for which the signal strength
is higher than a certain threshold are selected as POIs. Of these, the POIs selection
method based on CPA estimates is the most common use.
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Principal component analysis, as dimensionality reduction method, is another
technique for POIs selection. The time samples on traces have the maximize the
variability in the projection space of PCA are remained as POIs. So far, the effec-
tiveness of PCA-based profiled attack is not clear, as reported in [15, 16, 17] works.
Indeed, selecting the number of retained components as well as the threshold of
determination in PCA process is also not an easy task.
Profiled attacks, were presented in [18], used the wrapper method for finding
of POIs. In the wrapper method, subsets of time samples on the power traces are
evaluated by the prediction performance of a classifier and the subset has the best
performance is selected as POIs. To reduce the number of subsets of the wrapper,
hybrid method is used. That is, candidate features are first selected by a filter
then furthered refined by an accuracy wrapper. As claimed in [18], wrapper and
hybrid methods gave slightly better results. The issue with this approach is that
computational complexity and search space increase exponentially as the length of
trace increases.
Because of the capability of machine learning algorithms in determining the most
informative features from raw data inputs, machine learning algorithms can be used
to finding POIs of power trace. In the first work in this approach [19], SVM has been
trained and the sample points of trace which correspond to highly absolute value
of weights are selected as POIs. This method is also called normal-based feature
selection and strongly recommended by authors in [19].
1.2 Related Works
As yet, to our knowledge, there are only few works on finding POIs with noisy
traces. Furthermore, there have been no more studies on feature engineering in the
machine learning domain as applied to profiled attacks. For noisy traces, the authors
in [10] claim that the goodness of POIs selections depends significantly on the noise
level: as noise level increases the goodness of POIs selection decreases, while at
the same noise level, CPA estimation based POIs selection method is the best. This
drawback of the POIs selection method is confirmed by the authors in [18] regarding
the wrapper and hybrid method.
Inspired by the success of VMD [21] in feature engineering in machine domain, in
this work, we propose the method of combining VMD and GSO to find the POIs of
power traces. That is, VMD is used to decompose a trace into sub-signals, or modes
and POIs are selected from these modes by using GSO as the filer feature selection
method. Then, the selected POIs are used for SVM-based profiled attack. We denote
SVMVMD for our proposed attack. To demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed
attack method, we compare our method to two other SVM-based profiled attacks
using the SVM classifier. The first attack uses CPA as the POIs selection method
as in [5], so called SVMCPA and is currently considered to be the best method, and
the second one uses a normal-based feature selection method as in [19], so called
SVMNB. We also investigate the effectiveness of our method with noisy power traces,
which often happens in the real attack scenarios. Ours contributions are as follows:
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First, we investigate the ability of combining VMD and GSO for finding POIs
of the power traces.
Second, we propose an SVM-based profiled attack method that uses our POIs
selection method. This is a different approach for conducting profiled attack and it
is efficient for noisy power traces.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we describe
the background to this research: the profiled attacks, variational mode decomposi-
tion and Gram-Schmidt Orthogonalization and SVM. In Section 3, we present our
proposed SVM-based profiled attack. The experiments and their results are pre-




For profiled attack, the attacker must have a device with full control over that is
similar attack device. This device is called profiling device and used for leakage
information characterization by the attacker. In this work, an attack device that
runs a block cipher is used for our attack scenario and leakage is in the form of
power consumption. The implementation of profiled attack consists of two phases:
profiling phase on profiled device and attack phase on attack device.
In the profiling phase, a dataset of Np profiling traces is acquired from the
profiled device. The dataset is seen as the realization of the random variable Sp ≡
{(x1, z1), . . . , (xNp , zNp) ∼ Pr[X|Z]Np , where xi are the traces obtained from the
device processing the respective intermediate values zi = φ(P,K). Based on Sp,
a model is built to characterize the side channel leakage of the cryptographic device
for each hypothetical value zi. This can be modeled as F (X|Z) : X → P (Z).
In the attack phase, a dataset of Na attack traces are acquired from the target
device. The dataset is seen as a realization of Sa ≡ (k∗{(x1, z1), . . . , (xNa , zNa})
such that k∗ ∈ K, and for all i ∈ [1, Na], pi ∼ Pr[P ] and xi ∼ Pr(X|Z = φ(pi, k∗)].
Subsequently, a prediction vector is computed for each attack trace, based on a pre-
viously built model: yi = F (xi),∀i ∈ [1, Na]. A score, for example the probability,
is assigned to each trace for each intermediate value hypothesis zj, with j ∈ [1, |Z|].
The j-value of yi describes the probability of zj according to the model when the
attack trace is xi. These scores are combined over all the attack traces to output
a likelihood for each key hypothesis, and the candidate with the highest likelihood
is predicted to be the correct key. The maximum likelihood score can be used for
prediction. For every key hypothesis k ∈ K, this likelihood score is defined by





yi[zi] where zi = φ(pi, k). (1)
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2.2 Variational Mode Decomposition
VMD is a method used to decompose a real valued signal into narrowband sub-
signals, also known as intrinsic mode functions (IMFs) or simply VMD modes [20]
by Equation (2). In that x(t) is the orginal signal and uk(t) = Ak(t) cos(ϕk(t)), called
the kth mode, is the amplitude-modulation and frequency-modulation signal where
Ak(t) is the slowly varying, positive envelope and ϕk(t) is the phase. Each mode has







The finding simultaneously a set of modes and their central frequencies by VMD
is done by solving the optimization problem given by expression (3). This is the
constrained minimization process of sum of all mode’s bandwidth. The bandwidth
of each mode is estimated by 3 steps:
1. compute the analytic signal of each mode by using Hilbert transform so its
spectrum is positive;
2. multiply the analytic signal with a complex exponential for shifting its frequency
spectrum to baseband;




















uk(t) = x(t). (3)
The solution for (3) is equivalent to finding the optimal point of an uncon-
strainted augmented Lagrangian given by (4) where α is the penalty factor and λ(t)
is Lagrangian multiplier. And this optimization could be solved by using alternate
direction method of multipliers algorithm [21]. All modes of x(t) are computed in
frequency domain by (5) and (6) at each iteration of algorithm until the condition (7)
is met.
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After the convergence of this optimization, the inverse Fourier transform is ap-
plied to (5) to obtain the waveform of each mode. Because of the combination of
Wiener filtering, Hilbert transform and ADMM in VMD, VMD modes are highly
accurate in describing the different components of the original signal and robust to
noise.
2.3 SVM
SVM algorithms [22] is used to construct classifiers. The basic form of SVM is
the binary classifier which can classify two class by the largest-margin separating
hyperplane between them. Let the training data set be (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xN , yN),
where xi ∈ Rd is the inputs data point and yi ∈ {+1,−1} is the corresponding label
of xi. This data set is assumed to be linearly separable. The hyperplane separates
two class is given by expression (8).
f(x) = ωTx+ b (8)
where ω ∈ Rd is the weights and b ∈ R is the bias. The margin is caculated as the







Because there are many hyperplanes separating two classes, the objective of SVM is
finding one of hyperplanes that maximize the margin. So, the optimization of SVM
























This optimization problem can be converted to (11) because the margin does
not change when scaling ω and b.








≤ 0,∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N. (11)
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The quadratic programming should be used to solve (11) directly. However,
the solution is complicated when the dimensionality and the number of data points
increase. Then, the above problem can be usually solved by Lagrange multipliers
method through its duality problem. The Lagrangian of (11) is given by (12), and
its duality function is given by (13).












where λ = [λ1, λ2, . . . , λN ]
T and λn ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N .
g(λ) = min
ω,b














Combining the dual function of the Lagrangian and the constraints of λ, the






λnyn = 0, λ > 0. (14)
This is the convex optimization problem and satisfies the dual condition, so its so-
lution will satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KTT) conditions with variables ω, b, λ.
After finding the λ by KTT conditions, the pair (ω, b) is determined by the expres-
























where S = {n : λn ̸= 0} is the set of support vectors and NS is the number of





















In order to generalize well unseen data or work with linearly inseparable data,
soft-margin SVM is introduced. The key idea is the using of slack variables ξi
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to allow misclassification of difficult or noisy data points. Then, the optimization
problem (4) can be rewritten by (18).












≤ 0, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N,
ξn ≥ 0, ∀n = 1, 2, . . . , N,
where the parameter C is the penalty error that controls the trade-off between the
training error and the margin width. To solve (16), the same above approach should
be used.
In real application, the data set is almost nonlinear, SVM can be extended
to work well by using a function ϕ(.) that transforms the data point to higher
dimensional data that is linear separable [23]. To avoid calculation of this function
for all data points, the kernel function k(x, z) = ϕ(x)Tϕ(z) is used. Some popular
kernel functions are listed in Table 1.
Type k(x, z) Parameters
Linear xTz
Polynomial (r + γxTz)d d : degree, r : coef0, γ : gamma
RBF (Radial Basis Function) e−γ∥x−z∥
2
γ : gamma > 0
Table 1. Popular kernel functions
The output of an SVM classifier is the label of the input data point. However,
in some cases, the probability that the data point x belongs to a label needs to be
determined. To solve this problem, Platt [24] proposed a method of calculating this
probability value by (19) using the sigmoid function.
Pr(y = 1 | x) = 1
1 + exp(Af(x) +B)
. (19)
In which f(x) is the hyperplane generated by SVM training process. Parameter
pairs (A,B) are determined through minimal cross-entropy function by a different
training data set than the one used to train SVM to avoid over-fitting.
The SVM classifier solves the binary classification problem and it can be ex-
tended to solve the multi-class classification problem with two main strategies as
follows:
• One-vs-one strategy [24]: in this strategy multiple binary classifiers are con-
structed for each possible pair of classes. This results in M(M − 1)/2 classifiers
for M -classes data set. All classifiers are used to predict the label of a new data
point and the final decision is the label in which is the most voting.
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• One-vs-all strategy [25]: In this strategy, it is necessary to constructM classifiers
for M -classes data set in discriminating one class from the rest. The predicted
label for a new data point is based on the outputs of M classifiers with winner
takes all decision rule.
2.4 GSO-Based Feature Selection
As mentioned above, the finding of POI on the power trace is also known as the
feature selection in machine learning domain. The method of feature selection is
in two forms of wrapper and filter. In this paper, Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization
based feature selection method is used to select the POI of the traces. This method
is in the form of filter method, independent of the advance classifiers and is effective
in ranking he features contained in the traces based on criteria computed directly
from the traces. Indeed, this method allows the features to be determined without
weighting all of features in the traces. It ranks features based on the correlation
between features and the output target of a prediction model or the pre-assigned
label of features. Let xk = [xk1, xk2, . . . , xkN ]
T be the kth feature vector of N in-
stances, y = [y1, y2, . . . , yN ]
T be the output target and Q is the number of features.
This results in (N,Q) matrix feature data set. To define the relation between each





In formula (20), xk is a column vector containing N values of the k
th feature
in all Q features, αk is the angle of vectors xk and y. If they are perpendicular to
each other, the cosine of αk equals 0 meaning there is no correlation between them,
whereas when the angle between them becomes smaller, this correlation increases
and the maximum value is 1 when they are completely correlated.
The GSO-based feature selection process uses the formula (20) to quantify the
degree to which features are related to the output target. The first selected feature is
the most correlated input features with the output target by the cosine calculation.
The next features are selected according to the iteration process as follows until all
input features are ranked, or until a stopping condition is met [26]:
1. the rest input features and output target are projected on the subspace orthog-
onal to the selected feature;
2. the cosine calculations are done on this subspace for all projected features and
target output to find out the most correlated feature. This feature is added to
selected feature list.
3 THE PROPOSED METHOD
In this part, we present our proposed SVM-based profiled attack that uses the
combination of VMD and GSO for POIs selection of power traces.
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Figure 1. SVM-based profiled attacks framework
The proposed SVM-based profiled attack, shown in Figure 1, is carried out in
two phases: a profiling phase and an attack phase. In the profiling phase, power
traces are collected from the profiled device while it is executing a cryptographic
algorithm to form a trace data set. This trace data set is labeled according to
the Hamming weight of targeted value of the algorithm that needs to be profiled
Z1, . . . , Zm. Usually these targeted values are taken at the output of the S-box.
Because, they are 8-bit values that result in 9 Hamming weight classes from 0 to 8
denoted as: c0, c1, . . . , c8. This labeled set of traces is fed to the feature extraction
and selection block for mapping traces into feature space and the best features
are selected. These selected features are considered as POIs of the power trace
in feature space that should describe the statistical dependency of the Hamming
weight of the targeted value Zi with the power consumption. In the final step of
the profiled phase, POIs of all traces are used to train SVM to model the power
consumption characteristic of the profiled device. For training SVM classifier, its
parameters are selected as follows: the kernel function is RBF, the penalty factor
and width of kernel of RBF are optimized by Grey wolf optimization algorithm
presented in [27].
During the attack phase, unlabeled traces collected from the attack device are
fed into the feature extraction and selection block to select POIs and they are next
classified by the trained SVM model to determine the probabilities of the traces for
classes c0, . . . , c8. Finally, we compute the log likelihood for each hypothesis value
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PSVM (Xi | ci) =
Na∑
i=1
logPSVM (Xi | ci) (21)
where k is a hypothesis key byte value, ci = Hammingweight(Sbox(pi, k)), pi is the
plaintext associated with trace Xi, and the number of attack traces is Na. The key





3.2 Feature Extraction and Selection
Features or POIs selection is critical to the effectiveness of the profiled attacks. The
more precisely the features are selected, the better the ability to characterize the
power consumption of a profiled device, resulting in increasing attack efficiency and
vice versa. This section presents a new method for finding features of power traces
for SVM-based profiled attack. First, power trace characteristics are discovered as
follows:
The power trace collected during the operation of a cryptographic device de-
scribes its power consumption. It consists of many components in which dynamic
power dissipation is the most important [13]. This component depends on the pro-
cessed data of the circuit and is useful information leakage for power analysis at-
tack. The dynamic power dissipation mainly caused by the switching activity of
logic gates in a circuit which is controlled by the operating clock frequency so the
dynamic power consumption is driven by the clock frequency of circuit. Therefore,
in spectrum of power trace, it is expected that the clock frequency component has
significant magnitude compared to the other components. The information leakage
is nearly in the form of a both amplitude and frequency modulation signal and the
central frequency of its spectrum is the clock frequency. Generally, in a device, the
different parts of its circuit are controlled by different operating frequencies through
the clock division system, so the dynamic power dissipation is the combination of
some amplitude – frequency modulation signals with different center frequencies.
So, if it is possible to separate the dynamic power dissipation to amplitude – fre-
quency modulation signals with different center frequencies, one of these signals
contains significant information leakage related to target circuit part while other
does not.
As a result, the feature extraction process from power trace should ensure:
1. the remaining features contain the most important information of the trace
which is the dynamic power dissipation caused by the targeted circuit;
2. it could remove the other components of power traces;
3. it could reduce noise in the power traces.
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Fortunately, these requirements can be fulfilled by using VMD method. That is
because VMD decomposes a trace into different components and it is robust to
sampling and noise.
In our proposed method, VMD is used for extracting features from power traces.
VMD decomposes the signal into sub-signals, called VMD mode in this paper, which
are amplitude-modulated frequency-modulated signals so each mode contains a spe-
cific frequency spectrum with different center frequency. So, the VMD mode which
center frequency relates to clock frequency could be use as feature of the power
trace. Indeed, VMD can discover signal changes more accurately so that features of
power traces can be recognized more accurately. Moreover, VMD is robust to noise
because of using Wiener filter technique. Thus, VMD should be useful for using
noisy traces.
Unfortunately, VDM mode still contains redundant features which are not re-
lated to target variable that has been profiled. Therefore, they must be eliminated
for increasing the generalization capability of the classifier and reducing the volume
of training data. The elimination of redundant features is known as the feature selec-
tion. In previous related works, all features that are higher than a certain threshold





Index of selected POIs
GSO
(for POIs selection)
Figure 2. Feature selection procedure of power trace
To sum up, there are three phases in the proposed features extraction and selec-
tion method, as illustrated in Figure 2. First, VMD is used to decompose original
traces to VMD modes. In the VMD process, it is necessary to set parameters. The
number of decomposed modes K: VMD needs to preset the number of decomposed
modes K. If K is too small, the decomposed modes are too few, and all the de-
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composition modes cannot be captured; while if the value of K is too large, the
interfering signal will be over decomposed such that the center frequencies of modes
will be mixed. The penalty factor, α affects the bandwidth of the decomposed sig-
nal. To decompose traces by the VMD, the number of IMFs (K) and the quadratic
penalty factor(a) should be determined beforehand. In this study, the parameters,
K and α, were determined according to the following steps:
Step 1. Decompose a power trace into modes for different K = [1, 20] and α =
[5, 2 000].
Step 2. Add up the modes for each of the K and a values to obtain the recon-
structed power trace and estimate the values of Pearson correlation coefficient
for the reconstructed and original power trace.
Step 3. Select the sets of K and a values for maximum of Pearson correlation
coefficient.
For others input parameters of VMD: update rate, τ and convergence condition ϵ
are selected by standardization values in range 0 : 1e−6 [20].
In VMD mode selection phase, in order to determine which VMD mode has
frequency range that relates to frequency of operating clock our attack device and
this mode can be used as features of the power trace, we conduct correlation power
analysis (CPA) attacks on all the VMD modes. Based on the results of CPA attacks,
the VMD mode that has the largest correlation coefficient is selected.
In GSO feature selection phase, it is necessary to set number of selected fea-
tures, N . Our principle of finding the value of N is to find a trade-off between the
accuracy and the computation cost or execution time. So, the value of N that SVM
has the highest accuracy together with the lowest execution time is selected.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we show the experimental results of implementing profiled attacks
with the proposed new SVMVMD approach, which is based on SVM and the com-
bining of VMD and GSO for feature extraction and selection. We compared the
effectiveness of the proposed method with the two profiled attacks based on SVM
with points of interest selection by CPA in [5] called SVMCPA, and the normal-based
feature selection method in [19] called SVMSVMNB. The following parameters are
used to evaluate the effectiveness of an attack:
The ability to reveal the correct key: To confirm that our profiled attacks can
reveal the correct key used by AES-128, we figure out the probability of each
key being the actual key used. The key with highest probability is the most
likely one.
Guessing entropy [28]: This score is also known as average rank of correct key is
widely used to rate the effectiveness of side channel attack according to number
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of attack traces. By conducting the attack several times independently, guessing
entropy is calculated as follows:
1. the rank of correct key in all guessing keys are computed. This is the index
of correct in list all ranked key;
2. calculate the average indexes of the correct key.
In the paper, this guessing entropy has estimated over 10 independent attacks.
4.1 Dataset
Dataset 1. The set consists of 60 000 traces collected while AES-128 processed
intermediate values at S-box output. AES-128 was implemented on a Smartcard
Atmega8515 run on Sakura G/W. A sample of one of the collected power traces has
2 500 time-samples which is titled ‘Original trace’ in Figure 3.
Dataset 2. This data set consists of 100 000 traces downloaded from public DPA
contest v4 website at: http://www.dpacontest.org/v4. There is 4 000 time-
samples in a trace of a first-order masked AES implementation which the output of
S-box is Sbox(Pi + k
∗) ∗ M , where M is a mask [29]. When the mask values are
known, this data set are considered as an unmasked case.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Feature Selection Phase
In this section, we investigated the effect of the feature selection on the classification
accuracy of the proposed method. First, VMD is used to decompose original traces
to VMD modes. For VMD, two main parameters: the number of VMD modes
(K) and penalty factor (α) are initialized with K = 5, α = 1000 according to
procedure as described in Section 3.2. The VMD modes of both Dataset 1 and
Dataset 2 are depicted in Figures 3 and 4. As expected, VMD modes contain the
different components of the original signal at different central frequencies. In order
to determine which VMD mode has frequency range that relates to frequency of
operating clock our attack device and this mode can be used as feature of the power
trace, we conduct correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks on all the VMD modes.
Based on the results of CPA attacks, the VMD mode that has the largest correlation
coefficient is selected as the feature of the power trace. As results given by Table 2,
VMD mode 1 is selected as extraction feature of power trace in Dataset 1, and with
Dataset 2 it is VMD mode 2.
Table 3 represents the classification accuracy of SVM on Dataset 1 when ex-
tracted features are VMD mode 1 and the selected features are chosen by GSO.
Table 4 represents the classification accuracy of SVM on Dataset 2 when extracted
features are VMD mode 2 and the selected features are chosen by GSO. The se-
lected features are put into an SVM classifier for the training phase. As the feature
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Figure 3. VMD mode of the power trace on Dataset 1
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
Max correlation Key found Max correlation Key found
VMD mode 1 0.64 63 (correct) 0.52 108 (correct)
VMD mode 2 0.62 63 (correct) 0.87 108 (correct)
VMD mode 3 0.54 63 (correct) 0.80 108 (correct)
VMD mode 4 0.37 255 (wrong) 0.37 188 (wrong)
VMD mode 5 0.35 246 (wrong) 0.34 135 (wrong)
Table 2. Results of correlation power attack on VMD modes
dimension increases, so does the accuracy of the classification, but with too many
features the accuracy decreases because the features do not generalize the power
consumption characteristic well when used by the classifier. Therefore, the subset
of features with the highest accuracy and lowest feature dimensions are selected and
shown in the bold font.
4.2.2 Key Recovery Phase
In order to verify our proposed SVMVMD profiled attack has the ability to reveal
secret key of attack device. In the attack phase, SVMVMD is used to reveal the
secret key when classifying 9 hamming weight classes of S − box output. Instead of
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Dimensions Selected Features Classification
Accuracy
(%)
2 1 036 509 18.2
4 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 30.12
6 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 50.31
8 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 81.56
10 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 2 259
861
81.78
12 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 2 259
861 2 267 1 038
89.22
14 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265
2 259 861 2 267 1 038 411 577
95.03
16 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 2 259
861 2 267 1 038 411 577 886 1 687
95.02
18 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 2 259
861 2 267 1 038 411 577 886 1 687 1 211 1 670
94.27
20 1 036 509 2 261 2 262 2 263 2 260 2 264 2 265 2 259
861 2 267 1 038 411 577 886 1 687 1 211 1 670 1 576
216
92.84
Table 3. Acquired results considering extraction of features by VMD and selection by
GSO on Dataset 1
Dimensions Selected Features Classification
Accuracy
(%)
2 1 804 3 201 22.6
4 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 31.89
6 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 60.38
8 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 80.24
10 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 3 093
3 192
86.66
12 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 3 093
3 192 2 766 2 282
90.35
14 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 3 093
3 192 2 766 2 282 1 244 852
95.68
16 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556
3 093 3 192 2 766 2 282 1 244 852 2 392 1 797
96.62
18 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 3 093
3 192 2 766 2 282 1 244 852 2 392 1 797 2 251 3 113
94.58
20 1 804 3 201 1 664 2 389 689 3 231 1 524 1 556 3 093
3 192 2 766 2 282 1 244 852 2 392 1 797 2 251 3 113
3 108 1 095
90.28
Table 4. Acquired results considering extraction of features by VMD and selection by
GSO on Dataset 2
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Figure 4. VMD mode of the power trace on Dataset 2
predicting the class HW of each trace, we gave the posterior conditional probability
PSVM(Xi|c). The estimated probability of the hypothetical keys is determined by
the maximum likelihood estimation. The correct key is defined as the key with
the highest probability. For Dataset 1, which was collected in this experiment,
the first byte of the AES-128 key is 63, and that is indeed assigned the largest
probability value, as depicted in Figure 5. With Dataset 2, the recovery key is
108, identical to the key used to install AES in the DPA contest v4 (Figure 6).
These results prove that our attack method could correctly recover the key used by
AES-128.
Figures 7 and 8 report the GE corresponding to different numbers of traces
used for attacks with Dataset 1 when SVMVMD, SVMCPA and SVMNB are used to
predict hamming weight classes. As expected, the GEs of all attacks decrease as the
number of traces increases. Moreover, the larger the size of the training set, the lower
the GE. The reason for this is that the performance of SVM is determined by its
parameters, and the size of the training set is critical to finding the best parameters
for the SVM. With Dataset 2, we performed the same experiments as for Dataset 1,
and the GE calculated in the attack phases are presented in Figures 9 and 10. The
overall performance of all the attacks are the same as those for Dataset 1. Again,
SVMVMD achieves the best GE values.
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Figure 5. Probability of all hypothetical keys on Dataset 1
Figure 6. Probability of all hypothetical keys on Dataset 2
In Table 5, for each dataset we give the number of traces required by the profiled
attacks based on SVM for guessing entropy to reach 0. SVM-based VMD feature
extraction requires the minimum number of traces to recover the key, 10.2 and 5.3
traces on average, corresponding to 100 and 200 profiling traces, respectively. These
empirical results indicate that the SVM-based profiled attack with the VMD feature
extraction technique is more effective than the attacks with the CPA and normal-
based feature extraction techniques. This can be explained by the VMD extraction
technique allowing more effective selection of trace characteristics than the CPA and
normal-based POI selection methods.
Number of
Profiling Traces
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
SVMVMD SVMCPA SVMNB SVMVMD SVMCPA SVMNB
100 10.2 18.1 17.6 10.3 19.2 18.3
200 5.3 9.2 8.7 4.7 9.4 7.3
Table 5. Number of traces used by the attacks to attain GE = 0
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Figure 7. Attack performance with 100 traces/HW class on Dataset 1
Figure 8. Attack performance with 200 traces/HW class on Dataset 1
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Figure 9. Attack performance with 100 traces/HW class on Dataset 2
Figure 10. Attack performance with 200 traces/HW class on Dataset 2
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4.2.3 Results in the Case of Noisy Traces
The power traces are usually polluted with noise in practice. To examine the ef-
fectiveness of our proposed SVMVMD profiled attack in noisy condition, additive
Gaussian noise is added to the power traces. In our experiments, two noise level
of standard deviation SNR1 = 20 and SNR2 = 10 are added to both Dataset 1
and Dataset 2. In addition, different feature extraction techniques were used for
the SVM-based profiled attacks to investigate their effects on the efficiency of the
attacks in the presence of noise. Overall, the guessing entropy of all the attacks in-
crease with the level of noise, but the attack based on SVM with combining of VMD
and GSO is the least sensitive to noise. The results of our attacks with 200 profiling
traces per Hamming weight class, presented in Figures 11, Figure 12, 13 and 14 and
Table 6, show that out of SVMCPA, SVMNB and SVMVMD, the proposed method,
SVMVMD, has the best performance at both noise levels while SVMCPA and SVMNB
are comparable to each other. After adding noise to the power trace, the number
of traces required for GE to reach 0 increased by only 25% approximately with the
proposed attack, while it increased by over 100% for the other methods. This proves
that the VMD signal is insensitive to noise so the SVMVMD attack should work well
under noisy conditions. This property is very useful in real attack scenarios where
collected measurement traces invariably contain noise.
Noise Level
Dataset 1 Dataset 2
SVMVMD SVMCPA SVMNB SVMVMD SVMCPA SVMNB
SNR1 = 20dB 7.4 19.0 17.0 6.7 18.8 14.7
SNR2 = 10dB 8.6 25.7 23.6 9.8 21.6 20.2
Table 6. Number of noisy traces used by the attacks to attain GE = 0
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, the combining of variational mode decomposition and Gram-Schmidt
was proposed as a feature extraction and selection method of power traces. The
VMD mode that has central frequency related to clock operation frequency of the
attack device can be used as features of power traces and GSO can be used as a fea-
ture selection method. Experimental results show that an acceptable classification
accuracy can be achieved when SVM classifier uses these selected features as its
input. Compared to other SVM-based profiled attacks, the SVMVMD required the
minimum number of traces for successful key recovery. Furthermore, SVMVMD is
less sensitive to noise so can be used well with noisy power traces. In our opinion,
this work suggests a new approach for feature extraction from power traces using
variational mode decomposition, and this method should also be tested in com-
bination with other feature selection method and learning algorithms for profiled
attacks.
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Figure 11. Attack results on Dataset 1 with SNR1 = 20 noise added to power traces
Figure 12. Attack results on Dataset 1 with SNR2 = 10 noise added to power traces
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Figure 13. Attack results on Dataset 2 with SNR1 = 20 noise added to power traces
Figure 14. Attack results on Dataset 2 with SNR2 = 10 noise added to power traces
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